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he European Commission’s lengthy study of
company taxation – almost 500 pages – pro-
poses fundamental changes to the Europe’s corpo-
rate tax systems.1 The intent of the reforms is to
harmonize company tax bases so that company
taxes do not impose barriers on cross-border
investment or impair the consolidation of business
at the European level. The proposals, including
moving to a pan-European corporate tax, are quite
far-reaching and some quite novel. But, as the pro-
posals are currently structured, it appears to an
outsider that this debate on company tax reform
will likely fail to achieve its objectives. Instead, to
achieve significant results, a far more radical
approach will be needed to consolidate EU com-
pany tax systems that will demand far greater
political will than what the report sets out in its
proposals.
The proposed models for reform
Briefly, the four proposals made are the following:
1. a pan-European harmonized company tax
whose revenues would accrue to the European
Union replacing existing systems;
2. a European consolidated company tax operat-
ing alongside national systems with some or all
of the revenue accruing to the European Union;
3. a mutual recognition approach (Home State
Taxation) in which a company could use its
home state’s tax law to define income for its
European operations with the income allocated
to jurisdictions according to a formula and
taxed according to the rate where the income is
earned;
4. a harmonized EU system for determining tax-
able income (Common Base Taxation) which
would operate alongside national rules from
which companies can choose the tax system
they desire.
The essential problem is that trying to change the
way that taxes are collected among 15 countries is
often viewed as a zero-sum game since revenues
are expected to be kept constant. Moving to a new
method of collecting tax bases across countries
means that some governments will lose while oth-
ers gain. Moreover, with revenue neutrality, some
companies will be better off while others could pay
more tax.
One could try to increase the overall level of taxes
to ensure each government will not lose revenue.
However, increased revenues would mean a
greater tax burden for companies, eliminating
much of the political support for such measures.
Alternatively, if some companies are likely going
to pay more tax if the changes are revenue-neutral,
governments could cut corporate taxes to buy
greater political support but then governments
lose fiscally.Revenue-neutral tax reforms are often
difficult to accomplish.
The motivation for reform – capital market 
efficiency
The only way that the Commission’s proposals can
gain wide acceptance arises if there is a positive
sum game involved – governments and businesses
must feel that there are sufficient economic gains
that would make the whole exercise worthwhile.
It seems that the motivation for reform – removing
tax obstacles that would facilitate cross-border
investment and consolidation of businesses in
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and provide a basis for political acceptance. Many
businesses looking to create consolidated
European enterprises are more inclined to support
company tax reform if tax complexities that hinder
market efficiency and business consolidation are
lessened.
However, the report itself does not explicitly mea-
sure economic gains from harmonization and there-
fore provides insufficient evidence about the gains
from simplification and harmonization of tax bases.
The use of marginal effective tax rate2 analysis to
measure the impact of taxation on capital invest-
ments found that the statutory corporate tax rates
were far more important in explaining differences
among countries, than differences in the tax base.
However,the analysis is limited since it focussed on
some specific differences in tax bases, such as the
tax treatment of depreciation and inventories costs.
From this analysis, the impression given is that tax
systems are pretty similar in terms of the base, not
the rate of tax. If this were true, then it should not
be a difficult matter for the European countries to
agree to a common base.But,it is also true that har-
monization of company tax base, rather than tax
rate, in Europe may not be necessary.
Nonetheless, such effective tax rate calculations –
useful in other contexts – miss many important dif-
ferences that are hard to account for but are very
important to the company tax planner.As the report
argues, the most tangible results from the harmo-
nization of European company taxes would be to
• reduce compliance costs in dealing with 15 dif-
ferent systems,
• consolidate profits and losses at the EU level,
• simplify international restructuring and 
• reduce the need to determine transfer pricing
and allocating cost overheads.
Company tax systems among European countries
differ widely for several reasons (see the Table for
a comparison of some countries to illustrate these
differences). Accounting practices, such as the
treatment of reserves found in Germany, are quite
different than that found in some other countries
like the UK. Some countries require some recon-
ciliation of book accounts with tax, while others do
not.Further,cross-border acquisitions and mergers
are affected by differences in the treatment of cap-
ital gains and change of control rules for the trans-
fer of losses, valuation of assets upon merger, etc.
Timing issues can also impact significantly on tax
burdens – such as the carryforward and carryback
provisions or tax losses or when reporting require-
ments differ (annually, monthly or quarterly).
Such differences among countries in tax systems can
impair capital market efficiency, and if modelled,
would suggest possibly significant differences in
effective tax rates on capital. Businesses planning
capital investments will seek the greatest returns,
net of taxes paid by companies and their sharehold-
ers. Cross-border acquisitions could be discouraged
if a higher tax, such as the withholding tax or divi-
dend taxes on foreign investors, impose higher bur-
dens on cross-border transactions.3 On the other
hand, certain international tax planning opportuni-
ties could, in fact, encourage too many cross-border
transactions, especially when investments are chan-
nelled through third country entities. For example,
cross-border transactions are preferentially treated
when companies can take advantage of the infa-
mous “double dip” deduction for interest or insur-
ance expenses. The tax planning arises when a par-
ent can invest in a subsidiary by issuing first debt to
the subsidiary from a low-tax intermediary in a third
country.The assets of the low-tax entity are funded
with equity and the income from the low-tax entity
is remitted tax-free to the parent. In turn the parent
deducts interest on borrowed funds used to finance
equity in the low-tax intermediary (see Fuest,
Huber and Mintz (2002)).
The economic gain from increased capital market
efficiency and reduced compliance costs arising
from company tax reform for Europe is not easy to
measure but some estimate would have been valu-
able. Thus, each of the proposals in terms of their
contribution to improving economic efficiency and
reduce compliance costs have not been well docu-
mented.4 It is quite unclear as to whether the vari-
ous proposals themselves would ultimately achieve
the objectives stated above. Each proposal is dis-
cussed below.






gains from tax 
harmonization
2 See Part II of Commission of the European Communities (2001).
3 The EU has eliminated withholding taxes on income paid to resi-
dents of other member states. However, the current provisions for
providing relief from dividend taxes (such as a lower dividend tax
rate or tax credit) often apply to only residents of a country,not EU
residents elsewhere. Further, some countries provide dividend tax
relief for dividends distributed from income earned domestically,
not those derived from other EU sources.
4 Mintz and Weiner (2001) discuss some of the efficiency gains or
losses by comparing Home State Taxation with Common Base
Taxation.CESifo Forum 1/2002 5
Focus
Examples of Different Tax Provisions Across Selected EU Countries
Provision Belgium France Germany Italy UK
Corporate Tax  39% (top rate) 331/ 3 % plus 25% plus local 36% in income 30% (top rate)
Rate plus 3% surtax 6% surtax trade income (deduction for the
Minimum tax tax 55% surtax cost of new equity




Inter-corporate 95% exempt for Subject to equali- Exempt Taxable if from Exempt
Dividends qualifying partici- zation tax, exempt  resident company
pation from corporate  95% exempt if
tax if sufficient  from EU non-
ownership resident company
Capital Gains Capital gains  Fully taxed except Taxed although Under national Taxable
exempt for dividend for shares in rollover relief tax with substitute Relief is provided
participation cases subsidiaries (19% given for real tax of 27% or gains for inflation
rate plus surtaxes) estate disposals spread over 5 years
and exempt for for assets held at
shares held for least three years
one year in other
companies
Depreciation Straightline except Straightline except Straightline or Straightline Straightline for
for special cases for industrial assets declining balance buildings (industrial




Inventory Costs Lower of cost or Lower of cost or Lower of cost or Lower of cost Lower of cost
market value  market value LIFO  market value LIFO  market value market value LIFO 
LIFO
a) is permitted not permitted permitted in some LIFO is permitted is not permitted
circumstances
Reserves Deductible for Deductible for losses Reserves under Deduction for bad Deduction for
definite losses and expenses, GAAP deductible debts, foreign ex- provisions as under 
in the year foreign investments Some new change losses, re- GAAP but not more
and price increases restrictions apply tirement payments  than once
Losses Indefinite Carryforward for  Indefinite Carryforward Indefinite
carryforward five years except  carryforward for five years carryforward
but restricted for depreciation and one year Restricted upon against income from
change of control (indefinite) Three carryback change of control similar trading
year carryback source Group relief 
Change of control for losses
restrictions
Foreign Source Exempt by treaty or  Generally exempt Taxable with a Taxed with a credit  Taxed with a credit 
Income tax reduced by 75% credit Exemption for foreign taxes for foreign taxes
on net income given for dividends
earned abroad
Filing Quarterly install- Quarterly install- Based on calendar Filed within one Based on fiscal
ments for specific ments based on year (filing by May 31) month after period Quarterly
dates fiscal year Quarterly installment  approval of finan- installments for
payments cial statements with large companies
advance payments 
according to a 
specified rule
Residency Central manage- Registered address Corporate seats or Registered or Incorporation or
ment or registered place of management administrative central management
address office, or principal or control
corporate activity
Consolidation No Yes Yes No No
Special Regimes Co-ordination,  Headquarter and N/A N/A N/A
service and distri- logistics centres
bution centres
a) LIFO refers to “last-in-first-out” accounting methods to determine the price of the inventory stock.European company tax (Option 1)
The creation of a common European corporate tax
would accomplish significant harmonization. With a
common base used by all 15 countries, tax bases
would be substantially harmonized. Companies
would be taxed on their European profits, therefore
facilitating the consolidation of European opera-
tions.Tax administrators would face less difficulty in
dealing with transfer pricing, overhead cost alloca-
tions and other features of cross-border transactions.
The first option, a mandated harmonized Euro-
pean tax, would achieve the greatest efficiencies.
However, significant issues arise in that effectively
the tax is centralized. If revenues accrue to the EU
Commission, the state governments would need to
find alternative resources or receive a transfer to
make up the difference. The transfer to be calcu-
lated would presumably be related to the amount
of corporate income earned in each member coun-
try, which would effectively be a revenue sharing
arrangement. Member countries would need to
agree to a common base and would effectively lose
the flexibility to adapt their company tax systems
for their own needs. Moreover, with a centralized
company tax, member country personal tax sys-
tems would need to be revised since rules deter-
mining personal taxes on income accruing to
investors reflect existing tax systems.
Optional european consolidated company tax
(Option 2)
To ease the degree of change faced by member
countries,a second option is proposed that the new
tax base would be optional for companies. Thus,
both the European corporate tax and existing
national tax systems would be available for compa-
nies to select. Thus, companies operating in the
same country could operate under quite different
company tax regimes. Several substantial distor-
tions could therefore arise.
The first would be the possibility that businesses in
competition with each other domestically could
face quite different tax bills if one business is taxed
under the European company tax and another
under the national tax.
The second is significant erosion of the tax base.For
example, companies, not part of a corporate group,
would be able to engage in tax arbitrage to reduce
taxes paid on their inter-company transactions with
others.For example,if the European company tax is
levied at a higher rate than the domestic Greek tax,
financial transactions with debt borrowed by the
European company from the Greek entity would
result in a sharp reduction in tax paid.
A third problem is that differential taxes will dis-
tort the types of real and financial transactions and
the organization of businesses in partnerships or
stock companies. Even differential treatment of
such capital cost deductions can sharply impact on
business decisions.For example,a company operat-
ing under the European company tax with, say, lit-
tle depreciation given for machinery costs, could
lease assets from companies operating under
domestic regimes with, say, far more generous tax
writeoffs for depreciation.
Even if the distortions possible under an optional
European company tax were minimal, further dif-
ficulties arise. One important issue is with respect
to the use of revenues generated by the tax as in
the case of the first option.If the revenues are paid
to the European treasury, member countries will
find that they are short of funds. One would have
to consider offsetting intergovernmental transfers.
Instead, governments, according to some formula,
could share the revenues, but, under revenue-neu-
trality, some governments will gain and others lose
fiscally.
Home State Taxation (Option 3)
The option of Home State Taxation, consistent
with mutual recognition, would provide a far dif-
ferent and perhaps more practical approach to
company tax reform. A company’s European
income would be taxed according to the rules of
the resident country but with the base allocated
according to a formula with the tax paid deter-
mined by the rate of tax where the income is allo-
cated.The countries would need to agree to a set of
factors, such as distribution of payroll, assets, sales
and/or value-added5, to determine how income
CESifo Forum 1/2002 6
Focus
The option to select
the EU tax or the
national tax would





5 The proposed use of value-added is an intriguing idea. On one
hand,the European rules are fairly well harmonized so that it would
be easy to implement the use of value-added to determine the fac-
tors for allocating revenue.On the other hand,value added,as taxed
in Europe, is primarily income accruing to labour (and fixed factors
of production).To use value-added to measure the factors, the allo-
cation method would be particularly poor in measuring income











should be allocated to each country. Rules would
be needed to determine what companies belong to
a corporate group.
Home State Taxation itself raises a number of dif-
ficult issues for implementation.6 As in the case of
the European company tax proposal, companies
operating near each other in a particular jurisdic-
tion could be taxed under quite different systems.
For example, a UK company operating in Sweden
would still use UK rules to determine the tax base
while a Swedish company in Sweden would use
Swedish rules. Thus, many of the difficulties men-
tioned with business competitiveness, tax base ero-
sion and economic distortions would prevail under
Home State Taxation.
A further distortion with Home State Taxation is
that companies might change residency to reduce
their tax liabilities by choosing a country with a
more favourable tax base.However,not all compa-
nies will be in the same position to do “country
shop”. Some companies, by changing location,
might find it more difficult to raise capital from
their home jurisdictions (given regulatory and
other barriers to cross-border transactions). A
company might also have considerable “goodwill”
associated with operating in a particular country,
making migration more difficult. Finally, some
countries impose capital gains taxes on the disposi-
tion of shares when a company migrates so that
companies might find it more difficult to change
residency if it triggers substantial capital gains
taxes for its existing shareholders.
Another problem with Home State Taxation is
with regard to the administration of the tax system.
Each country’s revenue department would be
auditing companies that might operate under
15 different regimes, depending on their residency.
Countries could come to an agreement to let the
home tax authority have the responsibility of
auditing tax payments of the European operations
of the home-based country. However, letting for-
eign auditors handle tax compliance for another
country raises a number of serious problems with
respect to incentives to collect tax on behalf of
other countries,consistency with jurisprudence and
various procedural issues related to appeals and
other matters.
Common Base Taxation
The option of Common Base Taxation is similar to
that found in the US, Canada, Germany and
Switzerland. Companies would use a similar base
for their European operations. The income would
be allocated according to an allocation formula
and the tax rate imposed on income allocated to a
jurisdiction would be the domestic tax rate. Each
country would therefore receive its tax revenues
according to the allocation of the tax base and its
own tax rate. In principle, countries could use tax
credits that would provide some divergence from
the tax base since they would be deducted from tax
determined by the allocation method.
Although similar to existing systems found else-
where, the European proposal for Common Base
Taxation differs in one important matter. As pro-
posed, companies could choose whether they wish
to adhere to the Common Base or continue to fol-
low the rule of their country of residence or oper-
ation.Many of the difficulties,already raised above
with the optional European consolidated company
tax apply here. However, some further concerns
should be considered.
Common Base Taxation not only requires govern-
ments to agree to a common set of rules, they must
also agree to rules to allocate income to various
jurisdictions. If governments are given a choice of
the factors, as in the United States, substantial dif-
ficulties arise in that companies could, ultimately,
have more or less than 100% of their income allo-
cated across jurisdictions since country-factors
could add up to more or less than one depending
on the factors used.
A further problem is with respect to the tax treat-
ment of international income. Common Base
Taxation would be used for determining the alloca-
tion of European income to each country.
However, income earned from sources outside of
Europe could be subject to domestic tax or a
European tax. If the latter applies, countries would
need to agree to a common treatment of interna-
tional income.Given that some countries,like Italy
and the UK, tax foreign-source income (with a
credit for foreign taxes) while others provide sig-
nificant exemptions especially for dividends
(Netherlands and France), there is no common
approach used in Europe for the taxation of for-
eign-source income.
6 For a general discussion on the problems faced in using allocation
methods for corporate income taxation, see Mintz (1999).A need to rethink the company tax reform in the
EU
Outside of the compulsory EU company tax,which
would result in a single harmonized tax, the other
proposals are fraught with problems. The optional
approach, inherent in the three remaining options,
would substantially erode efficiency gains from
harmonization since companies would have
greater opportunities to engage in tax arbitrage
domestically, not just with respect to cross-border
transactions. A serious question arises as to
whether an optional EU company tax, Home State
Taxation or Common Base Taxation, is worth the
effort. The objectives set out for harmonization
will be achieved in a limited way given these three
options:
• Compliance costs in dealing with 15 different
systems will be somewhat simplified for busi-
nesses that choose the consolidated base.
However, complexity will be introduced in
other ways. Since some companies will remain
with national systems, rules will grow to limit
opportunities for tax arbitrage. Further, some
conglomerate companies will find that they
must deal with 16 rather than 15 systems in
terms of tax planning.
• It will be easier for businesses to consolidate
profits and losses at the EU level. However,
with the existence of national systems, signifi-
cant trading of losses will transpire through var-
ious financial transactions (asset disposals,
financial swaps etc.) that might result in restric-
tive rules imposed by countries to limit such
trading.
• International restructuring will be simplified to a
certain extent but it will require clear rules to be
adopted for the tax treatment of foreign-source
income earned by consolidated companies.
• Although transfer pricing and allocation of costs
will be more easily dealt with for consolidated
companies, such problems will continue to exist
for foreign companies and national companies.
Given that the allocation method itself introduces
certain complexities and the optional approach
could result in substantial inefficiencies and unfair-
ness, it seems that the latter three options would
result in minimal economic gains, if any at all.This
leaves the first option, the mandated European
company tax, as the remaining option with poten-
tial significant gains. However, shifting a taxing
power from national governments to the European
Union raises other issues that are quite difficult to
deal with, as discussed above.
Conclusion: Some alternatives
My overall conclusion is that the proposed reforms
in the EU for company tax would unlikely achieve
desired results. However, two approaches, neither
explicitly dealt with in the Commission approach,
could be considered.
The first would be to have a mandated consolidat-
ed tax with an allocation approach to divide the tax
base amongst the EU members,similar to that used
in North America, Switzerland and Germany. This
would require a common base and allocation sys-
tem for the system to work best. But, each nation-
al government would have sufficient flexibility in
that it would levy a tax rate and a regime of tax
credits that would allow it to receive revenues and
to conduct industrial policy as it wishes. However,
to achieve a pan-European consensus on a com-
mon tax base and factors is not a simple matter
since, unlike Canada and US, there is no federal
company tax to model company tax bases at the
national level. Thus, it would take considerable
political will on part of EU countries to agree to a
common tax base.
The second would be to seek limited harmoniza-
tion by implementing common rules for certain
aspects of domestic tax systems to deal with the
more egregious areas of inefficiency. As an exam-
ple, the EU countries have successfully agreed to
eliminate withholding taxes amongst themselves to
encourage cross-border transactions. In a similar
vein, countries could provide for the deferral of
capital gains taxes on cross-border mergers.
Dividend tax relief could be provided for both res-
ident and EU investors. A system for the consoli-
dation of profits and losses could be considered,
similar to the UK loss transfer system, although
without a common base it would be difficult to
devise a proper one. These reforms are piecemeal
in approach so that they do not achieve all the
objectives being sought.
If EU countries wish to maximize efficiency gains,
then it seems that a move to a non-optional com-
mon tax base would best achieve results.
Otherwise, the approaches being considered will










tax would result in
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not provide sufficient economic gains to make the
effort worthwhile.
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